Since the judicial misadventure that produced a judgment seemingly purporting to derecognise the NDC was handed down by the Federal High Court, presided over by Hon. Justice A H. Dashen on Friday 26 June 2026, the entire Nigerian legal and political landscape has been awash with strong condemnation of the decision. The reasons are obvious: the party at whose instance the court effectively sat on appeal over its own earlier judgment is unknown to law, and there exists no juridical basis, either in theory or in practice, for a judge of coordinate jurisdiction to revisit and overturn an earlier judgment in the manner that occurred.

In the flurry of public reactions, a wide range of assumptions has been made, largely because many commentators have not had the opportunity to read the original judgment of the court. Amid this confusion, a few individuals have gone further, advancing outright falsehoods with shameless boldness.

What is even more troubling is the mischief of those who seek to mislead Nigerians by arguing that the NDC did not submit itself to the statutory registration process but merely obtained a court order compelling its registration. This narrative has unfortunately been enabled by INEC, which has chosen to display such a description on its website. The inconsistency is striking, given that INEC does not use similar descriptions for politicians who obtained their party tickets through court orders.

To dispel these deliberate misrepresentations, the Centre for Community Law has decided to publish the 10 December 2025 judgment of the same judge, which unequivocally confirmed that the NDC fulfilled all statutory requirements for registration, including payment of the prescribed fees.

It also shows that the court dealt exhaustively with all the issues canvassed, including that relating to logo. Here’s what Hon. Justice A H. Dashen said at pages 17 and 18:

“It is well established that a party cannot approbate and reprobate on a single issue. The appellate courts have repeatedly held that equity forbids “blowing hot and cold” at the same time. The Court of Appeal in Globe Motors v. lbraheem (2021) LPELR-54550(CA), and the Supreme Court in Nyako v. Adamawa State House of Assembly (2016) LPELR-41822(SC), emphasised that once an administrative or litigating party adopts a position, it cannot subsequently contradict itself to secure unfair advantage. In the present case, Exhibit NOC 3 makes no mention whatsoever of Peace Movement Party (PMP), and the belated reliance on Peace Movement Party (PMP) in litigation is therefore an impermissible afterthought which carries no probative value”.

His Lordship continued:

“The fulcrum of this Court’s inquiry lies in Section 222 of the Constitution. That prov1s1on exhaustively prescribes the substantive conditions an association must satisfy before functioning as a political party. The Supreme Court in INEC v. Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72, per Ayoola JSC, held that the conditions in Section 222 are complete in themselves and cannot be enlarged, added to, or diminished by guidelines or administrative policies of the Independent National Electoral Commission. In that case, the apex court invalidated provisions of INEC which sought to introduce additional obligations beyond Section 222. It further stated that once an association satisfies Section 222, INEC is bound to register it, registration constitutes evidence of compliance, not discretionary grace”.

Categorically:

“With respect to the allegation of logo similarity, Section 222(e) of the Constitution does not empower INEC to reject a logo merely because it visually resembles that of an existing party. The mischief the framers sought to regulate are ethnic and religious connotations or sectional exclusivity neither of which is asserted nor proved here. Any administrative guideline that elevates “visual similarity” to a substantive disqualifying ground constitutes an unconstitutional enlargement of Section 222 and is void to that extent. The Supreme Court in INEC v. Musa (supra) teaches that neither the legislature nor INEC may add to or subtract from the eligibility criteria in Section 222; thus, even Section 79 Electoral Act and any guideline made pursuant thereto must be interpreted subject to Section 222”.

These judicial pronouncements cannot but discredit the mischievous narrative circulating in the media that the NDC failed to submit itself to the INEC registration process.